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24/30504596 DC BS EN IEC 63147 Standard criteria for accident monitoring instrumentation for nuclear power generating stations, 2024
- 45A_1571e_CD.pdf [Go to Page]
- FOREWORD
- IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 1. Overview [Go to Page]
- 1.1 Scope
- 1.2 Purpose
- 1.3 Word usage
- 1.4 Application
- 2. Normative references [Go to Page]
- 2.1 Normative references for IEEE domain
- 2.2 Normative references for IEC domain
- 3. Terms and definitions
- 4. Symbols and abbreviations
- 5. Selection criteria [Go to Page]
- 5.1 Type A variables
- a) Take specific planned manually-controlled actions that are required for safety systems to perform their safety functions as assumed in the plant accident analysis licensing basis.
- b) Take specific planned manually-controlled actions that are required to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) as assumed in the plant accident analysis licensing basis.
- NOTE—Type A variables relate to manually-controlled actions that serve as the primary credited safety function. Type A variables do not relate to manually-controlled actions when the primary credited safety function relies on automatic control with ma... [Go to Page]
- 5.2 Type B variables
- 5.3 Type C variables
- 5.4 Type D variables
- a) Indicate the performance of those safety systems and auxiliary supporting features necessary for the mitigation of DBEs.
- b) Indicate the performance of other systems and auxiliary supporting features necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition.
- c) Verify safety system status. [Go to Page]
- 5.5 Type E variables
- a) Monitoring the magnitude of releases of radioactive materials through identified pathways (e.g., plant vent/stack, fuel building exhaust, atmospheric dump valves, secondary safety valves and condenser air ejector).
- b) Monitoring the meteorological conditions used to determine the dispersion characteristics of releases of radioactive materials through identified pathways (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, and air temperatures).
- c) Monitoring radiation levels and radioactivity inside the plant and outside of the plant.
- d) Monitoring radiation levels and radioactivity in the control room and selected plant areas where access may be required for plant recovery. [Go to Page]
- 5.6 Type F variables
- 5.7 Documentation of selection criteria
- NOTE— IEEE Std 1819™ identifies and discusses the criteria for risk-informed categorization and treatment of electrical and electronic components, which the user designates into safety significant categories for nuclear power generating stations. The ...
- 6. Performance criteria [Go to Page]
- 6.1 Range
- 6.2 Accuracy
- 6.3 Response time
- 6.4 Required operating time
- a) The required operating time for Type A variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- b) The required operating time for Type B variable instrument channels shall be at least the duration associated with the longest-duration design basis event for that variable.
- c) The required operating time for Type C variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD or at least 100 days.
- d) The required operating time for Type D variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- e) The required operating time for Type E variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- f) The required operating time for Type F variable instrument channels shall be sufficient to implement mitigation guidance based on the longest duration analyzed severe accident event in addition to any design basis event that may precede it. [Go to Page]
- 6.5 Reliability
- 6.6 Documentation of performance criteria
- a) Allowances for calibration uncertainties, loop errors, and drift (consistent with the methodology given in ANSI/ISA Std 67.04.01-2006 [B2]).
- b) The magnitude and direction of errors imposed on the accident monitoring instrumentation by environmental and/or seismic conditions during and after the postulated event.
- 7. Design criteria [Go to Page]
- 7.1 Single failure
- a) Any single detectable failure within the accident monitoring instrumentation concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.
- b) Failures occurring as a result of the single failure.
- c) Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the accident requiring the accident monitoring function. [Go to Page]
- 7.2 Common cause failure
- 7.3 Independence and physical separation
- a) Instrumentation shall be physically separated from non-safety system equipment and circuits so that a failure in, or spurious action by, non-safety system equipment and circuits shall not prevent the accident monitoring equipment from meeting the r...
- b) Redundant segments shall be independent of, and physically separated from, each other to the degree necessary to retain the capability of accomplishing the accident monitoring function during and following any design basis event requiring that func...
- c) Accident monitoring equipment required to monitor a specific design basis event should be independent of, and physically separated from, the effects of the design basis event in order to retain the capability to meet the requirements of this standard.
- d) Independence and physical separation shall meet the requirements of IEEE Std 384™/IEC 60709. [Go to Page]
- These requirements do not preclude the association of accident monitoring instrument channels with safety system channels, provided this association does not compromise the ability of the safety system channel to meet the applicable safety system requ...
- 7.4 Isolation
- 7.5 Information ambiguity
- a) Having the capabilities of being able to perturb the measured variable and determine which channel has failed by observing the instrument channel.
- b) Cross checking the value with an independent channel that monitors a different variable that bears a known relationship to the instrument channel.
- c) Providing an additional independent channel of instrumentation. [Go to Page]
- 7.6 Power supply
- 7.7 Calibration
- 7.8 Testability
- a) By observing the effect of perturbing the monitored variable
- b) By observing the effect of introducing and varying, as appropriate, a substitute input to the sensor of the same nature as the measured variable
- c) By cross checking between channels that bear a known relationship to each other using either manual or automatic means
- d) By automatic on-line diagnostics of channel availability [Go to Page]
- 7.9 Direct measurement
- 7.10 Control of access
- 7.11 Maintenance and repair
- 7.12 Multi-purpose instrumentation indications
- 7.13 Auxiliary supporting features
- 7.14 Portable instruments
- 7.15 Documentation of design criteria
- 7.16 Cyber security
- 8. Qualification criteria [Go to Page]
- 8.1 Type A variables
- 8.2 Type B variables
- 8.3 Type C variables
- 8.4 Type D variables
- 8.5 Type E variables
- 8.6 Type F variables
- 8.7 Portable instruments
- 8.8 Operating time
- 8.9 Documentation of qualification criteria
- 9. Display criteria [Go to Page]
- 9.1 Display characteristics [Go to Page]
- 9.1.1 Information characteristics
- 9.1.2 Human factors engineering
- 9.1.3 Anomalous indications
- 9.1.4 Continuous vs. on-demand display
- 9.2 Trend or rate information
- 9.3 Display identification
- 9.4 Type of monitoring channel display
- 9.5 Display location
- 9.6 Information ambiguity
- 9.7 Recording
- 9.8 Digital display signal validation
- 9.9 Documentation of display criteria
- 10. Quality assurance
- Annex A
- (informative)
- Accident monitoring instrument channel accuracy [Go to Page]
- A.1 Introduction
- A.2 Accuracy requirement groupings according to usage
- A.3 Typical accuracy requirements
- Annex B
- (informative)
- Examples of monitoring channel displays
- Annex C
- (informative)
- Operational state diagram
- Annex D
- (informative)
- Variable Mapping to IEC 61226
- Annex E
- (informative)
- Bibliography [Go to Page]
